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استیون ای. لُبل

نظریهٔ واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

ترجمهٔ محمدرضا بیگدلی



بنگاه ترجمه و نشر
کتاب پارسه

پی‌نوشت‌ها

مقدمه

۱. از واقع‌گرایی ساختاری اغلب به عنوان نواقح‌گرایی نیز یاد می‌شود. مشاهده کنید:

Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization*, vol. 38, no. 2 (1984), pp. 225–286.

با این حال ما طی این کتاب از اصطلاح واقع‌گرایی ساختاری استفاده می‌نماییم که بیشتر بیانگر مکانیسم علی محسوب می‌شود.

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

3. Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

۴. این امر را محتوای محرمانه ضبط شده جلسات کمیته اجرایی شورای امنیت ملی ایالات متحد تأیید می‌کند. برای اطلاعات بیشتر رجوع شود به:

Sheldon M. Stern, *Averting "The Final Failure": John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

5. Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, 1st ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011); Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International*

- Security*, vol. 36, no. 3 (2011), pp. 41–78; Zachary Selden, “Balancing against or Balancing with? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony,” *Security Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2 (2013), pp. 330–364; and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific,” *International Security*, vol. 38, no. 4 (2014), pp. 115–149.
6. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet- Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). See also Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo,” in *Psychology and Deterrence*, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 34–59; Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Egypt under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post Populist State,” *Social Problems*, vol. 28, no. 4 (1981), p. 454.
 7. T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 155–164; and Amy Oakes, “Diversionsary War and Argentina’s Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” *Security Studies*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2006), pp. 449–451.
 8. Stern, Averting “*The Final Failure*,” pp. 159–175, 178–179, and 204.
 9. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 4 (1997), p. 518. Classic liberal works include Bruce M. Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001); James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); John M. Owen, IV, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and* O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001); Patrick J. McDonald, *The Invisible Hand of*

Peace: Capitalism, the War Machine, and International Relations Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, *Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected System: Complex Transformations* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

برای مطالعه بیشتر در مورد تحلیل انتقادی «لیبرالیسم تجاری» رجوع شود به مقاله:

Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean- Marc F. Blanchard, "Commercial Liberalism under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936," *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1996–1997), pp. 4–50.

10. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); and G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

۱۱. ما متوجه هستیم که برخی از نظریه‌های لیبرال تعامل بین متغیرهای سطح نظام (بین‌المللی) و سطح واحد (داخلی) را مطرح می‌کنند. با این حال معتقدیم که به صورت کلی نظریه‌های لیبرال اهمیت علی توزیع نسبی قدرت را کم‌رنگ جلوه می‌دهند.

12. J. Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," *International Studies Review*, vol. 5, no. 3 (2003), p. 326.
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 17. Ibid.
 18. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no.1 (1997), p. 6.
 19. Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 205–212; 301–314; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
 20. Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *International Organization*, vol. 38, no. 2 (1984), pp. 287–304.
 21. Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2010), pp. 117–143.
۲۲. برای اطلاعات بیشتر رجوع شود به:
- Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 184–186.
23. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 159–160.

24. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144–172.
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- Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics*, vol. 40, no. 1 (1987), pp. 82–107; and Dale Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
5. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3 (1988), pp. 485–507.
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در خصوص مطالعه استدلال معکوسی که معتقد است نظام چندقطبی پایدارتر از دوقطبی است، رجوع کنید به:

Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, vol. 16, no. 3 (1964), pp. 390–406.

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10. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

۱۱. گزینه‌های دیگری که در اختیار دولت‌ها قرار دارد عبارت است از: مماشات، فرار از تهدیدات و جنگ پیشگیرانه. برای مطالعه بیشتر رجوع شود به:

Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 74–75;

Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," *International Security* vol. 19, no. 1 (1994), pp. 108–148; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1987), pp. 17–49; Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 164–165; Jack S. Levy, "Preventive War and Democratic Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 52, no. 1 (2008), pp. 1–24; and Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2008), pp. 152–158.

12. See, for example, Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 7–53

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15. William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 2.
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17. Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Raab (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 101– 126.
18. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 28– 31.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 18– 19.
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23. Steven E. Lobell, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Grand Strategy between the World Wars,” in *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars*, ed. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1– 36.
24. Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
25. See Steven E. Lobell, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 53–

- 63; and Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, pp. 195–196.
26. See Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US- China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 2 (2005), pp. 7–45; and Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., *Rising China: Theoretical and Policy Perspectives* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
۲۷. در حالی که والتز چنین استدلال می‌کند که نظریه موازنه قوا نیازمند فرضیه عقلانیت نیست، اما اکثر واقع‌گرایان ساختاری موضوع رویکرد عقلانی را فرضیه اصلی واقع‌گرای ساختاری قرار داده‌اند، زیرا در چهارچوب نظریه سیاست بین‌الملل اگر دولت‌ها فاقد عقلانیت بودند هیچ راه دیگری وجود نداشت که به واسطه آن تهدیدها و فرصت‌های سطح نظام به صورت قابل توجهی نقش مهمی ایفا نمایند. رجوع شود به:
- Miles Kahler, “Rationality in International Relations,” *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 919–941; and John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” *International Relations*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2009), pp. 241–256.
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29. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Ballantine, 1994). See also Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, pp. 115–119.
30. See, for example, Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, pp. 217–271; Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 107–146; and Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann, and Joe D. Hagan, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior,” in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 309–336.
31. On Hitler’s folly, see Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940–1941* (New York: Penguin, 2007), p. 385. On Stalin’s failure, see David E. Murphy, *What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

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34. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War”; Copeland, *Origins of Major War*; and Douglas Lemke, “Investigating the Preventive Motive for War,” *International Interactions*, vol. 29, no. 4 (2003), pp. 273– 292.
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36. Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 216– 217.
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39. Michael Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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44. See Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks*, pp. 123– 131.
45. Thomas Juneau, *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).
46. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*. See also Snyder, *Myths of Empire*; Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks*.
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48. Ripsman, “Curious Case of German Rearmament.”
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- نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک لین در خصوص «هژمونی فرمانطقه‌ای» به شدت از مکتب ویسکانسین در تاریخ‌نگاری روابط خارجی ایالات متحد بهره می‌برد. رجوع شود:
- William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. and enlarged ed. (New York: Dell, 1962).
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12. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 28– 29.
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19. *Ibid.*, pp. 123– 128, 161– 163. See also Joao Resende- Santos, *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
20. Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural Realism Meets World History," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 4 (1996), pp. 403– 438; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Waltz and World History: The Paradox of Parsimony," *International Relations*, vol. 23,

- no. 3 (2009), pp. 446– 463; Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” pp. 131– 157; Richard Little, “Structural Realism and World History,” in *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, ed. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85– 101; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391– 425; and David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
21. Jervis, *System Effects*, pp. 109– 110; Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 51– 53; and Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” in *Realism: Restatement and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 173– 193.
22. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” p. 343.
23. Barry Buzan, “Beyond Neorealism: Interaction Capacity,” in *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, ed. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 69.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 77, fig. 4.1.
26. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” p. 169.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 169– 170.
28. Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 7– 10.
- ون اورا به این متغیرهای سیستمی به‌عنوان واقع‌گرایی نوع سوم «واقع‌گرایی ساختاری ریز بافتار» اشاره می‌کند که متمایز از واقع‌گرایی نوع دوم کنت والتز و جان میرشایمر محسوب می‌شود.
29. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” p. 171; See also Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167– 214.
30. Benjamin Miller, *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and*

Collaboration in World Politics, 1st pbk. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 64– 67.

31. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 3 (2000), pp. 135– 138.
32. See, for example, James W. Davis Jr. et al., “Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense- Defense Theory,” *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1999), pp. 179– 206.
33. See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2010), pp. 7– 43; A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660- 1783* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890); and Halford John Mackinder, *Britain and the British Seas* (New York: Haskell House, 1969).
34. On the loss- of- strength gradient, see Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 260– 262 and 268– 269.
35. See Hans Mouritzen and Mikkel Runge Olesen, “The Interplay of Geopolitics and Historical Lessons in Foreign Policy: Denmark Facing German Post- War Rearmament,” *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 45, no. 4 (2010), pp. 406– 427; Hans Mouritzen, “Past versus Present Geopolitics: Cautiously Opening the Realist Door to the Past,” in *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation*, ed. Annette Freyberg- Inan, Ewan Harrison, and Patrick James (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 164– 190
۳۶. دسلر چنین می‌نگارد: «نظریهٔ سیاست بین‌الملل و التز [طی پیکربندی ساختار به‌مثابه یک محیط، به‌طور دقیق نمی‌تواند آن ویژگی‌های نظام را که عامل کنش هستند، نسبت به محیطی که در آن کنش انجام می‌شود، مفهوم‌سازی کند. «دسلر»، در مناظرهٔ ساختار- کارگزار چه چیزی در معرض مخاطره است؟» ص ۴۶۸.
37. Benjamin Frankel, “Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction,” in *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. ix– xx.

38. Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 211.
39. Brian C. Schmidt and Thomas Juneau, "Neoclassical Realism and Power," in *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics: Bringing Power Back In*, ed. Else Toje and Barbara Kunz (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 61; See also Brian C. Schmidt, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2005), p. 525.
40. Schmidt, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," p. 528; and Schmidt and Juneau, "Neoclassical Realism and Power," p. 61.
41. Schmidt and Juneau, "Neoclassical Realism and Power," p. 62.
- برای تجزیه و تحلیل بحث‌های مربوط به [مفهوم] قدرت در بین مکاتب مختلف نظریه‌های روابط بین‌الملل رجوع شود به:
- Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
42. David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), p. 185.
43. See, for example, William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 6–7; and Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy for World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 17–18.
۴۴. به‌عنوان مثال، شوئلر برای اندازه‌گیری قابلیت‌های نسبی قدرت‌های بزرگ در دوره بین دو جنگ، به شاخص قابلیت ایجاد همبستگی از سوی جنگ متکی است. رجوع شود به: Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, pp. 26–31; and Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 131.
45. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1963), pp. 110–148.
46. Schmidt and Juneau, "Neoclassical Realism and Power," p. 62.

47. See, for example, Stefano Guzzini, "The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2004), pp. 495–521; and Stefano Guzzini, *Power, Realism, and Constructivism* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

۴۸. این تعریف از قطب‌مبتهی بر بحث است:

- Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 131; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), pp. 9–13; and Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 12.
49. Wohlforth, "Stability of a Unipolar World," pp. 9–22. For a critique of Waltz's treatment of bipolarity, see R. Harrison Wagner, "What Was Bipolarity?" *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 1 (1993), pp. 77–106.
50. See, for example, Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 159; and John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 155–156.
51. See G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, "Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," in *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1–32, at p. 6.
52. Wohlforth, *Elusive Balance*, pp. 129–137; and idem., "The Stability of a Unipolar World," p. 22.
53. James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 10–11.
54. Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, "Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 282–287.
55. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar*

- American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 60; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 22– 28; idem., *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 21– 26. Quasi- state actors, such as ISIL/ ISIS, Hezbollah, and Boko Haram,
- آن‌هایی که پایگاه‌های سرزمینی و قدرت نظامی دارند و به دنبال ظرفیت‌های دولتی هستند نیز می‌توانند تهدیدهای حداقلی برای قدرت‌های غیر بزرگ در نظام بین‌الملل محسوب شوند. [مانند تشکل‌های سیاسی و گروه‌های جدایی‌طلب]
56. Our thinking on opportunities is influenced by Van Evera, *Causes of War*, pp. 74– 75.
57. See, for example, Charles A. Duelfer, and Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.- Iraq Experience,” *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2011), pp. 73– 100; and John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January– February 2003), p. 54.
58. James P. Levy, *Appeasement and Rearmament: Britain, 1936- 1939* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); and Peter Neville, *Hitler and Appeasement: The British Attempt to Prevent the Second World War* (New York: Hambledon Continuum, 2006).
59. Yaakov Katz and Yoav Hendel, *Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow of War* (Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2012), pp. 61– 84.
60. Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre- Dreadnought Era, 1880. 1905* (New York: Alfred A. A. Knopf, 1940); and Jon T. Sumida, *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889. 1914* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), Table 21.
61. Wesley K. Wark, *The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933– 1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
۶۲. برآوردهای اطلاعاتی بریتانیا به شکل مداوم چنین نتیجه‌گیری می‌کرد که با توجه به نیاز آلمان به تجدید تسلیحاتی، آلمانی‌ها به احتمال زیاد تا سال ۱۹۴۰ آمادگی جنگ با بریتانیا را ندارند. See Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?”

- The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2008), pp. 148– 181.
63. Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
64. Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 170– 193.
65. See, for example, Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 129– 132; Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495- 1975* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 17– 18; Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances*, pp. 16– 19; Brooks and Wohlforth, *World out of Balance*, pp. 12– 13; and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 42– 43.
66. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1998), pp. 141– 170, esp. 150– 152.
67. Justice Potter Stewart, Concurring, *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
۶۸. برای بحث در مورد اینکه چگونه مکاتب مختلف نظریه‌های روابط بین‌الملل با «عدم قطعیت» برخورد می‌کنند رجوع شود به:
- Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 3 (2007), pp. 533– 557.
- در مورد این استدلال که بازیگران سیاسی و اقتصادی چگونه تحت شرایط مخاطره‌آمیز و مبتنی بر عدم اطمینان عمل می‌کنند رجوع شود به:
- Stephen C. Nelson and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Uncertainty, Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2008,” *International Organization*, vol. 68, no. 2 (2014), pp. 361– 392.
69. Emily O. Goldman, *Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 14.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

۲۹۲ ■ نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

۷۱. همان‌طور که در ادامه توضیح خواهیم داد، «قریب‌الوقوع بودن» در اینجا صرفاً بیان مجدد مؤلفه وضوح افق زمانی نیست. وضوح افق‌های زمانی به توانایی تشخیص تهدیدها و فرصت‌های کوتاه‌مدت از بلندمدت اشاره دارد. برای مثال رجوع شود به:

Uri Bar-Joseph and Jack S. Levy, "Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 124, no. 3 (2009), pp. 461–488.

۷۲. بنابراین، در محیط‌های تحدیدکننده، سیاست داخلی از اهمیت کمتری برخوردار است. رجوع شود به:

Ripsman, "Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups."

73. Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, "Conclusion," pp. 282–283. See also Oren, *Six Days of War*

74. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 5.

75. Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954," *International Security*, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988), pp. 5–49; and idem., "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Security Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2007), pp. 1–31.

76. Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 146–200.

۷۷. فرانسس گاوین به‌عنوان مورخ، خاطر نشان می‌کند که میزان تغییرات در دکترین هسته‌ای ایالات متحده و سطوح نیروهای متعارف در اروپا بین دولت‌های آیزنهاور و دولت کندی به اندازه خرد عرفی آن دوران دقیق نبود. رجوع شود به:

Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 30–56.

78. On the 1815 settlement, see Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

79. Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865–1940," *International Organization*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1997), pp. 65–97.

فصل سوم

1. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World*

Politics, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144–177.

۲. این نشان‌دهندهٔ پیشرفت کونز و سالتزمن است که تنها دو دستهٔ کلی را در نظر می‌گیرند: «ادراکات در فیلتر کردن محدودیت‌های سیستمی» و «محدودیت‌های داخلی در سیاست خارجی».

Barbara Kunz and Ilai Z. Saltzman, “External and Domestic Determinants of State Behaviour,” in *Neoclassical Realism in European Politics: Bringing Power Back In*, ed. Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), pp. 96–116. Instead, our classification is influenced more directly by Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism,” in *The International Studies Compendium Project*, ed. Robert Denmark et al. (Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell, 2011).

3. Ole R. Holsti, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1989), pp. 15–43; Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *Causes of War* (Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2010), pp. 83–185; Walter Carlsnaes, “Foreign Policy,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 331–349; Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013).

۴. همان‌طور که در مقدمه اشاره شد، بسیاری از این متغیرها به‌عنوان متغیرهای مستقل توسط محققانی غیر از واقع‌گرایان نوکلاسیک نیز مورد استفاده قرار می‌گیرند. با این‌حال واقع‌گرایان نوکلاسیک از آن‌ها به‌عنوان متغیرهای مداخله‌گر به روشی سیستماتیک که در این فصل توضیح داده شده است استفاده می‌کنند.

5. Yuen Foong Khong, “Foreign Policy Analysis and the International Relations of Asia,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, ed. Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 81–99; Michael Roskin, “From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 89, no. 3 (1974), pp. 563–588.
6. Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of Realist Tradition,” in *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), p. 211.

7. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 2 (1999), pp. 28–41; and Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 38–42.
8. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 1 (1997), pp. 1–25; and Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311–348, at p. 319.
9. See for example, Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Stanley Allen Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson, *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); and Barbara Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
۱۰. برای استدلال‌هایی مبنی بر اینکه عوامل شناختی نقش مهمی در تغییر سیاست اتحاد جماهیر شوروی ایفا کردند، رجوع شود به:
 Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," *World Politics*, vol. 45, no. 2 (1993), pp. 271–300; Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning By Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 2 (1994), pp. 155–183; and Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," *International Organization*, vol. 57, no. 1 (2003), pp. 77–109.
11. Rose McDermott, "Arms Control and the First Reagan Administration:

- Belief- Systems and Policy Choices,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2002), pp. 29– 59.
12. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back in,” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 107– 146. See also Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 124– 137; and Jerrold M. Post, *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
13. Paul A. Kowert and Margaret G. Hermann, “Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign Policy Making,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 41, no. 5 (1997), pp. 611– 637.
14. Philip B. K. Potter, “Does Experience Matter? American Presidential Experience, Age, and International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 51, no. 3 (2007), pp. 351– 378.
۱۵. جورج و جورج این فرضیه را مطرح می‌کنند که «ماهیت دینامیک رفتار سیاسی ویلسون در این اصل نهفته است که قدرت برای او یک ارزش جبران‌کننده بود، وسیله‌ای برای بازگرداندن عزت نفس آسیب‌دیده در دوران کودکی [توسط پدر کمال‌گرای او]..از همین رو تمایل او به قدرت همزمان با نیاز به تأیید، احترام و به‌ویژه احساس داشتن فضیلت کاهش یافت.
- Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: J. Day, 1956), p. 320.
- فرضیه روانکاوانه جورج و جورج بعدها توسط محققان دیگری به چالش کشیده شد. محققانی که معتقدند ناسازگاری ویلسون در کنفرانس صلح پاریس و بعداً در جریان مبارزه برای تصویب معاهده ورسای ناشی از بیماری جسمی او بود، به‌ویژه سکنه‌های ناتوان‌کننده او طی سال‌های ۱۹۱۸–۱۹۱۹ رجوع شود به:
- Jerrold M. Post, “Woodrow Wilson Re- Examined: The Mind- Body Controversy Redux and Other Disputations,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1983), pp. 289– 306; and Juliette L. George and Alexander L. George,

“Comments On ‘Woodrow Wilson Re- Examined: The Mind- Body Controversy Redux and Other Disputations,’” *Political Psychology*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1983), pp. 307– 312.

برای مطالعات بیشتر مراجعه کنید به:

Rose McDermott, *Presidential Leadership, Illness, and Decision Making* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

16. Doris Kearns, “Lyndon Johnson’s Political Personality,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.91, no. 3 (1976), pp. 385– 409.
17. Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1951); Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision- Making,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 2 (1969), pp. 190– 222; Ole R. Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” *Journal of International Affairs*, vol 21, no. 1 (1967), pp. 16– 39; and Jack S. Levy, “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision- Making,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 307.
18. Levy, “Psychology and Foreign Policy Decision- Making,” p. 307. See also Ole R. Holsti, “The ‘Operational Code’ Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles’ Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1970), pp. 123– 157; Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1977), pp. 129– 168; Stephen G. Walker and Lawrence S. Falkowski, “The Operational Codes of US Presidents and Secretaries of State: Motivational Foundations and Behavioral Consequences,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1984), pp. 237– 266; and Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 3 (2000), pp. 529– 543. More recently, see Gerald M. Post, ed., *The Psychological Assessment*

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24. Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 17–58.
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29. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33– 75; Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 3 (1999), pp. 433– 446. See also T. V. Paul, *The Tradition of Non- Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2009).
30. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and John M. Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 202– 239. Also see, G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
- ایکثیری در مورد نظم‌های مشروط یا به تعبیری وابسته به قانون بحث می‌کند و آن‌ها را در مقابل موازنهٔ قدرت و نظم‌های هژمونیک قرار می‌دهد.
31. Richard J. Samuels, *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Michael D. Barr and Zlatko Skrbis, *Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation- Building Project* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2008), pp. 112– 126; James Cracraft, *The Revolution of Peter the Great* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 75– 113; and Yucel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish*

- Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 46– 50.
32. See Norrin M. Ripsman, “Domestic Practices and Balancing: Integrating Practice into Neoclassical Realism,” in *International Practices*, ed. Vincent Pouliot and Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 200– 228, at pp. 207– 208.
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 39. Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” *Review of International Studies*, vol. 36, no. 1 (2010), p. 132.

40. Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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45. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Ethnic Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914- 1923* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 90; and Arthur Mendel, "On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia," in *Russia Under the Last Tsar*, ed. Theofanis G. Stavrou (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), pp. 13– 41, at p. 36.
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Press, 2003); and Kevin Narizny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

۴۸. یکی از مشکلات این نوشتار علمی این است که گروه‌های بومی پایگاه بسیار اندکی برای فتح دولت دارند. لذا جک اسنایدر استدلال می‌کند که این گروه‌ها به یکدیگر می‌پیوندند تا یک ائتلاف قدرتمند تشکیل دهند. چنین ائتلاف‌هایی بیشترین فرصت را دارند تا دولت‌ها را در جاهایی که قدرت بسیار متمرکز است مانند سیستم‌های سیاسی کارتل‌شده‌ای مانند آلمان و ژاپن در دهه ۱۹۳۰ به دست آورند. پیامد آن گسترش بیش از حد یک گروه بومی یا گروه مورد نظر است، زیرا هر گروه عناصری از خط مشی یا برنامه توسعه‌ای را که بیشتر ترجیح می‌دهد، اشاعه می‌دهد. با این حال، گسترش‌های متعدد می‌تواند منجر به تعهد بیش از حد استراتژیک و احاطه خود شود. در درازمدت، حتی گروه‌های حامی امپریالیستی نیز از گسترش غیرمولد آسیب می‌بینند.

Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

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50. Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in War-time* (New York: Free Press, 2002).
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52. Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 11– 13.
53. Steven E. Lobell, “Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain’s Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preferences, 1903– 1906, 1917– 1923, 1930– 1932,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1999), pp. 671– 694; and idem., *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 19– 41.
54. Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military*

- Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Jack S. Levy, "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1986), pp. 193–222.
55. On veto players, see George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
۵۶. برای مثال، مدل‌های سیاست سازمانی و بوروکراتیک گراهام آلیسون در مورد تصمیم‌گیری در حوزه سیاست خارجی، تأثیر فرآیندهای نهادی داخلی، روال‌های سازمانی و سیاست‌های داخلی دولت را بر فرآیند سیاست‌گذاری خارجی برجسته می‌کند.
- Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1999).
57. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1983), pp. 205–235; and idem., "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 4 (1983), pp. 323–353.
- کریستوفر لین با این ادعا که دموکراسی‌ها می‌بایست کمتر مستعد جنگ باشند، استدلال‌های نهادی را رد می‌کند. رجوع شود به:
- Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, vol. 19 (1994), pp. 5–49.
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59. See Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post- World- War Settlements* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002); and Kenneth Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- برای بحث در مورد محدودیت‌های داخلی متفاوت نظام‌های ریاست جمهوری، پارلمانی و ائتلافی، رجوع شود به:
- David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), chapters 4, 5, and 6.

60. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*. See also Peter Gourevitch, "Domestic Politics and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 309–328, at p. 312.
61. Michael Mastanduno, "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government?" in *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Peter L. Trubowitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 227–242.
62. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*.

جک اسنایدر استدلال می‌کند که دموکراسی‌ها در توسعه‌طلبی بیش از حد مشارکت نخواهند کرد و مارک براولی نیز چنین استدلال می‌کند که دموکراسی‌ها به احتمال زیاد ائتلاف‌های وسیع‌تری برای جنگ ایجاد می‌کنند و احتمالاً در جنگ‌ها بیشتر پیروز می‌شوند. Snyder, *Myths of Empire*; and Mark R. Brawley, *Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and Their Challengers in Peace and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 21–22. Also see David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 86, no. 1 (1992), pp. 24–37; and Randall L. Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 2 (1992), pp. 235–269.

۶۳. برخلاف دموکراسی‌ها که به پایگاه گسترده‌ی حمایت داخلی نیاز دارند، دولت‌های غیردموکراتیک به پشتیبانی ائتلاف کوچک‌تری نیاز دارند. لذا این ائتلاف کوچک به راحتی می‌تواند در سیاست‌های اقتصادی خارجی مشارکت کند که امکان رانت را برای یک گروه ذی نفع محدود فراهم می‌کند.

۶۴. در مورد اهمیت اعمال سیاسی، رجوع شود به:

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices Introduction and Framework," in *International Practices*, ed. Vincent Pouliot and Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3–35; and Ripsman, "Domestic Practices and Balancing".

۶۵. البته، عدم تحزب هر دو راه را قطع می‌کند، زیرا تحزب دولت‌ها را ملزم به مشورت با قانون‌گذاران می‌کند.

Ripsman, "Domestic Practices and Balancing."

66. On executive autonomy, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Hugh Heclo, *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974); and Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*.
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68. Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: Americas Anti- Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 245– 295.
69. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, pp. 46– 68.
70. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 215– 222.

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2. James Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, no. 1 (1998), pp. 289– 313; and Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 7– 53. Cf. Shibley Telhami, “Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2002), pp. 158– 170.

در مورد تمایزی که والتز بین سیاست خارجی و روابط بین‌الملل قائل است، رجوع شد به: see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979), p. 64; and idem., “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 55– 57.

۳. در این راستا، ما تحت تأثیر تصور پاتریک جیمز از واقع‌گرایی ساختاری هستیم.

Patrick James, “Neorealism as a Research Enterprise: Toward Elaborated Structural Realism,” *International Political Science Review*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1993), pp. 123– 148, esp. pp. 135– 136. Also see idem., *International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002).

4. See Dale C. Copeland, “International Relations Theory and the Three Great Puzzles of the First World War,” in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014), pp. 167– 199; and Ronald P. Bobroff, “War Accepted but Unsought: Russia’s Growing Militancy and the July Crisis, 1914,” in *The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making*, ed. Jack S. Levy and John A. Vasquez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 227– 251.
5. Quoted in Daniel W. Drezner, “The Challenging Future of Strategic Planning in Foreign Policy,” in *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Daniel W. Drezner (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2009), p. 4.
6. US Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, “Mission Statement,” <http://www.state.gov/s/p/>, accessed April 20, 2015.
7. Steven E. Lobell, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Grand Strategy between the World Wars,” in *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars*, ed. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1– 36, at p. 15. See also John Lewis Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?” in *Conference on American Grand Strategy after War* (Durham, NC: Triangle Institute for Security Studies and Duke University

- Program in American Grand Strategy, Duke University, 2009), pp. 1– 17, <http://tiss-nc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/KEYNOTE.Gaddis50thAniv2009.pdf>, accessed December 5, 2015.
8. See, for example, Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13.
 9. Steven E. Lobell, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 53– 68.
 10. Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940– 1941* (New York: Penguin, 2007), p. 5.
 11. Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
 12. On reassurance signaling, see Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” *International Organization*, vol. 54, no. 2 (2000), pp. 325– 357; and Evan Montgomery, “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2006), pp. 151– 185.
 13. On underbalancing, see Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2004), pp. 159– 201; and idem., *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2006).
 14. See, for example, Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Mark R. Brawley, “Factoral or Sectoral Conflict? Partially Mobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial Germany,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 4 (1997), pp. 633– 654.
 15. Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 5 and 127– 128.
 16. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981) and Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.
 17. See Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge,

MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), especially pp. 423–476 and 693ff.

۱۸. مجموع آثاری که درباره شکست واقع‌گرایی ساختاری، به طور کلی و نظریه موازنه قدرت والتز به طور خاص، در خصوص عدم پیش‌بینی یا توضیح مناسب پایان جنگ سرد بحث می‌کند، مفصل هستند. برخی از آثار اصلی که به این بحث می‌پردازند عبارتند از: *Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), pp. 5–41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 3 (2000), pp. 5–53; and Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, “Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War,” *Security Studies*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2000), pp. 60–107.

۱۹. به نوشتار بررسی شده از سوی گیدئون مراجعه کنید:

«Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144–172.

20. Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” *World Politics*, vol. 40, no. 1 (1987), pp. 82–107.

21. See Dale Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Jack S. Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 3 (1990–1991), pp. 151–186; and Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

22. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (1993), pp. 44–79.

23. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981).

24. See, for example, Norrin M. Ripsman, “Domestic Practices and Balancing:

- Integrating Practice into Neoclassical Realism,” in *International Practices*, ed. Vincent Pouliot and Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 200–228.
25. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 107–146; and Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher M. Jones with Charles W. Kegley Jr., *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, 7th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), pp. 489–518.
26. S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security,” *Security Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2003), pp. 79–105; idem., *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 117–131; and Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India- Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 143–166.
27. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3–31. Also see Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
28. Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in *The Culture of National Identity: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317–357.
29. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” *World Politics*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1991), pp. 506–507.
- با این حال، مخالفت مردم آلمان با سلاح‌های هسته‌ای (به‌ویژه بعد از جنگ سرد) به این معنا نیست که رهبران جمهوری فدرال آلمان هیچ‌گاه در پی سلاح هسته‌ای نبوده‌اند. برای تجزیه و تحلیل چگونگی تلاش دولت آدناور برای دستیابی به یک بازدارنده هسته‌ای بین سال‌های ۱۹۵۴ و ۱۹۶۳ و اینکه چگونه دولت‌های ارهارد و کیزینگر بین سال‌های ۱۹۶۴

و ۱۹۶۹ به‌دنبال حفظ گزینه تسلیحات [هسته‌ای] بودند، اما در نهایت به خواست ایالات متحد در خصوص عدم اشاعه تسلیحات [هسته‌ای] تن دادند، رجوع شود به:

- Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security*, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015), pp. 91–129.
30. Steven E. Lobell, "The Political Economy of War Mobilization: From Britain's Limited Liability to a Continental Commitment" *International Politics*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2006), pp. 283–304.
31. See Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post- World- War Settlements* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002).
32. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*, pp. 83–85; and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 216–217. See also Eric J. Hamilton, "International Politics and Domestic Institutional Change: The Rise of Executive War- Making Autonomy in the United States," PhD diss., School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 2015.
33. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*, pp. 70–90.
34. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
35. For serious theoretical approaches to the nuclear "taboo," see T. V. Paul, *The Tradition of Non- Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non- Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
36. Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, "Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical Realism," in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W.

- Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 282– 287.
37. Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 170– 193.
38. James McCormick, “Interest Groups and the Media in Post- Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy,” in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post- Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 170– 198.
۳۹. برای تجزیه و تحلیل اینکه چگونه ایران با بهره‌برداری از حمایت خود نسبت به حزب‌الله لبنان قدرت خود را فزونی بخشیده، رجوع شود به: Thomas Juneau, *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 139– 168; and Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 79– 107.

فصل پنجم

1. James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research,” *Political Analysis*, vol. 14, no. 3 (2006), p. 230.
2. For example, King, Keohane, and Verba use the term “research question.” See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 14– 19. George and Bennett use the terms research “problem” or “puzzle.” See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 74– 79.
- برای بحث قبلی در مورد معماهای تحقیق رجوع شود به:
Dina A. Zinnes, “Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher: Presidential Address,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1980), pp. 315– 342.

3. Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 43– 44.
 4. Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post- World War Settlements* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 3, 6– 7.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
 6. Jillian Schwedler, “Puzzle,” *Qualitative and Multi- Method Research*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2013), pp. 27– 30, quote from p. 28. See also Zinnes, “Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher,” pp. 317– 318.
 7. Schwedler, “Puzzle,” p. 28.
 8. Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 9. Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144– 177.
 10. Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino- American Conflict, 1947– 1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 4.
 11. Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 6.
 12. Steven E. Lobell, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 1– 2.
 13. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 85.
۱۴. در مورد بحث امکان یادگیری از سوی رهبران و تغییر در باورهای آن‌ها، رجوع شود به:
 Nuno P. Monteiro, “We Can Never Study Merely One Thing: Reflections on Systems Thinking and IR,” *Critical Review*, vol. 24, no. 3 (2012), pp. 343– 366, esp. pp. 345– 346.
۱۵. به عقیده‌ هو مکارتنی، اثبات‌ گرایی منعطف به موقعیت روش‌ شناختی اشاره دارد که با اثبات‌ گرایی غیرمنعطف این مفروضات را مشترک است: الف. دستیابی به شناخت عینی

۳۱۲ ■ نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

از جهان امکان‌پذیر است و ب. آزمون تئوری و تحلیل تجربی از ویژگی‌های بارز تحقیق علمی اجتماعی هستند. رجوع شود به:

Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 2 (2009), pp. 451–480, at p. 457n.

See also Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 11–44, at pp. 15–16; and Nina Tannenwald, "Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2 (2005), pp. 13–42.

16. As Lakatos notes, "no finite sample can ever disprove a universal probabilistic theory." Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91–196, at p. 102.

حتی در علوم طبیعی، جایی که می‌توانیم نظریه‌ها را با دقت بیشتری آزمایش کنیم، بهترین کاری که می‌توانیم انجام دهیم این است که یک فرضیه باطل را فقط با یک سطح اطمینان خاص رد کنیم، به عبارتی این بدان معناست که ما تصدیق می‌کنیم که هنوز فرصتی وجود دارد هرچند اندک که یافته‌های ما توزیع داده‌های زیربنایی را نشان ندهند. بنابراین، ما هرگز نمی‌توانیم در مورد اثبات یا رد یک نظریه کاملاً مطمئن باشیم، مگر اینکه بتوانیم کل توزیع موارد را مشاهده کنیم.

۱۷. در واقع این امر حتی در علوم طبیعی نیز صادق است، جایی که معادلات رگرسیون چند متغیره استاندارد به طور معمول شامل یک عبارت خطا و نتایج شامل سطوح اطمینان می‌شوند.

18. Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures," p. 232. See also Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, pp. 46–48; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 131–135; and Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 9 (2006), pp. 457–458.
19. Mahoney and Goertz, "A Tale of Two Cultures," p. 230. King, Keohane, and Verba's treatise on qualitative methods adopts the "effects- of- causes" approach to causality common in quantitative methods and privileges

- identifying causal effects over causal mechanisms. King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 85– 86.
20. Mahoney and Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures,” p. 231. Also see James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Casuality,” *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 41, nos. 4– 5 (2008), pp. 412– 436; and Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, pp. 46– 47.
۲۱. نمونه‌ای از یک اثر واقع‌گرایانه نوکلاسیک که از طرح تحقیق چند روشی استفاده می‌کند: Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
22. Mahoney and Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures,” p. 239.
- اغلب پژوهشگران کیفی نیز موارد «منفی» را برای آزمایش نظریه‌های خود انتخاب می‌کنند، رجوع شود به:
- James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” *American Political Science Review*, vol. 98, no. 4 (2004), pp. 653– 669.
۲۳. سطوح تحلیل در سطح متغیر وابسته برای مطالعات سیاست بین‌الملل با سطوح تجمیع متغیرهای مستقل مطابقت ندارد.
۲۴. صریح‌ترین بحث در مورد مسئله سطح تحلیل که مربوط به متغیرهای وابسته (به‌جای متغیرهای مستقل) است:
- Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 7– 53. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 54– 57; and Colin Elman, “Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz,” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 58– 61.
25. Balkan Devlen and Ozgur Ozdamar, “Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises,” in *Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation*, ed. Annette Freyberg- Inan, Ewan Harrison, and James Patrick (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 136– 163.
26. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism: The Psychology of Great Power

- Intervention,” in *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 38– 54.
27. Lobell, *Challenge of Hegemony*, p. 1
28. Ibid., p. 14.
29. Ibid., pp. 12– 13, 19– 20.
30. Ibid., p. 15. On structured focused comparison, see Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focussed Comparison,” in *Diplomacy: New Approachs in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43– 68; and George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 66– 72.
31. Lobell, *Challenge of Hegemony*, p. 15.
32. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, pp. 13– 14.
33. Ibid., p. 14.
34. See Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy for World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 39– 58 and 59– 92.
35. Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 3 (2010), pp. 158– 196, at 158.
36. Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, p. 23.
37. Ibid., pp. 52– 54.
۳۸. در واقع نارنگ این موضوع دوم را با روش‌های کمی بررسی می‌کند، در حالی که اولین سؤال «علل و معلول‌ها» خود را با مطالعات موردی بررسی می‌کند.
- Ibid., pp. 222– 252; and Vipin Narang, “What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 57, no. 3 (2013), pp. 478– 508.
39. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 17, fn. 47.

40. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 161.
41. Evan N. Resnick, "Strange Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience," *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2010), p.144
 این مقاله مشابه خط مبنای نورین ام ریپسمن در خصوص چانه‌زنی بین ایالات متحد و متحدانش در فردای پس از جنگ [جهانی دوم] است.
 Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*
 ۴۲. برای بررسی تمایز بین نظریه‌های توازن و نظریه‌های موازنه قوا، رجوع کنید به:
 Daniel H. Nexon, "The Balance of Power in the Balance," *World Politics*, vol. 61, no. 2 (2009), pp. 330– 359.
 مبنای نظریه‌های واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک شوئلر، نارنگ و رزنیک از آنچه که نکسون آن را نظریه‌های توازن می‌نامد نشئت می‌گیرد.
43. Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 10.
44. Ibid.
 شوئلر دو راهبرد غیرموازن‌کننده را ذکر می‌کند که شیوع آن‌ها بیش از آنچه که نظریه موازنه نوواقع‌گرایی پیشنهاد می‌کند، گسترده است. رجوع شود به:
 ibid., p. 7.
45. Ibid., pp. 46– 68.
46. Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, pp. 1– 12.
47. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," in *Adelphi Papers No. 171* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

۳۱۶ ■ نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

۴۸. به گفته نارتنگ، اتخاذ یک موقعیت تحریک‌کننده از سوی یک قدرت منطقه‌ای دارای سلاح هسته‌ای یا حتی دارای قابلیت هسته‌ای از منظر فرضیه خودیاری واقع‌گرایی ساختاری گنج‌کننده است. به واسطه وضعیت تحریک‌کننده، یک قدرت منطقه‌ای به مداخله دیپلماتیک یا نظامی به‌موقع یک کشور ثالث (معمولاً ایالات متحد) برای نجات آن از حمله متعارف یا هسته‌ای همه‌جانبه همسایه وابسته است رجوع شود به:

Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, pp. 48–49.

49. Thomas Juneau, *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 1–2, 7

۵۰. به‌عنوان مثال رجوع شود به:

Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

51. Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
52. See, for example, Charles A. Lave and James G. March, *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993).
53. Devlen and Ozdamar, “Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crises,” pp. 142–143.

۵۴. شوئرلر به شکل متناقض به اجماع نخبگان، انسجام نخبگان، انسجام اجتماعی و آسیب‌پذیری دولت/رژیم به‌عنوان متغیرهای مستقل نظریه کسری موازنه خود در برخی نقاط کتاب و به‌عنوان متغیرهای مداخله‌گر در نقاط دیگر اشاره می‌کند. رجوع شود به:

Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, pp. 15, 19, 63, and 69.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 62–64.

۵۶. پیشنهاد می‌شود برای ایجاد بینش‌هایی که می‌توانند به طور سیستماتیک در خصوص تأثیر علمی مورد آزمایش قرار گیرند، از مطالعات کمی استفاده شود. رجوع شود به:

Bruce N. Russett, “International Behavior Research: Case Studies and Cumulation,” in *Approaches to the Study of Political Science*, ed. Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (Scranton, PA: Chandler, 1970), pp. 425–443.

57. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean- Marc F. Blanchard, “Commercial Liberalism

- under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936,” *Security Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1996–1997), pp. 4–50.
58. Norrin M. Ripsman, “Two Stages of Transition From a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 4 (December 2005), pp. 669–693.
59. Bennett and George, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 20–21, 240–244.
60. Mahoney and Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures,” p. 237; and Goertz and Mahoney, *A Tale of Two Cultures*, pp. 46–47, 192–196.
61. Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, “Negative Case Selection: The Possibility Principle,” in *Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide*, ed. Gary Goertz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 193.
62. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, pp. 63–68.
63. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies*.
64. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, pp. 248–252..
65. Lobell, *Challenge of Hegemony*, pp. 16–17.
۶۶. نارنگ، بریتانیا را به دلیل ادغام نیروهای هسته‌ای بریتانیا و ایالات متحد از سال ۱۹۵۸، به‌عنوان کشوری که دارای زرادخانه هسته‌ای مستقل است طبقه‌بندی نمی‌کند.
Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, p. 3, fn. 3.
67. Paul A. Papayanou does this in “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I,” *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 4 (1996), pp. 42–76.
۶۸. ایالات متحد در میان کشورهای لیبرال دموکرات غیرمعمول است، زیرا رئیس‌جمهور، مشروط به تأیید سنا، نامزدها را معرفی می‌کند. هفت لایه بالای شانزده بخش اجرایی و نهادهای مختلف مستقل و همچنین سفیران و فرماندهی‌های نظامی بزرگ. در طول دولت جورج دبلیو بوش، در مجموع ۳۳۶۱ پست قوه مجریه با انتصاب ریاست جمهوری پر شد. رجوع شود به:
William A. Galston and E. J. Dionne Jr., “A Half Empty Government Can’t Govern: Why Everyone Wants to Fix the Appointments Process, Why It Never Happens, and How We Can Get It Done,” in *Governance Studies at Brookings* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2010).

۳۱۸ ■ نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

اما در بریتانیا تنها ۱۲۲ انتصاب از سوی نخست‌وزیر وجود دارد: بیست و دو وزیر کابینه و یکصد وزیر جوان در بیست و چهار وزارتخانه. رجوع شود به:

Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street <https://www.gov.uk/government/how-government-works>, accessed August 21, 2014.

۶۹. به‌عنوان مثال در ایالات متحد، احکام شدیدی علیه تحلیلگران و مدیران اطلاعاتی که تلاش می‌کنند بر سیاست‌ها تأثیر بگذارند وجود دارد. برای مرور بر روابط تحلیلگر و سیاستگذار در ایالات متحد، رجوع شود به:

Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE/ CQ, 2012), pp. 199–216.

۷۰. برای تجزیه‌و‌تحلیل دقیق نقش مسلط استالین در تدوین استراتژی کلان شوروی و سیاست‌های خارجی در دوران بین جنگ جهانی دوم و اوایل جنگ سرد رجوع شود به:

Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Geoffrey Roberts, *The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's Pact with Hitler* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); and V. M. Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

۷۱. به‌عنوان مثال، در تصمیم بمباران راکتور هسته‌ای عراق در ژوئن ۱۹۸۱، بگین نیاز به رأی‌گیری از کل کابینه داشت. با این حال، این تصمیم اساساً در کمیته ویژه وزیران گرفته شد و نه در کابینه اصلی دولت، رجوع شود به:

Yehuda Ben Meir, *National Security Decisionmaking: The Israeli Case* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986); and Jonathan Renshon, *Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 41–58.

72. Shlomo Nakdimon, *First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb* (New York: Summit, 1987), pp. 158–168.

73. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s," *International Security*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2008), pp. 148–181; Steven E. Lobell, "Bringing Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936–1939," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 35, no. 6 (2012), pp. 747–773; and idem., "Balance of Power, Components

of Power, and International Relations,” unpublished manuscript, University of Utah, n.d.

74. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp. 294–313.

۷۵. در مورد چین پس از مائو، گردانندهٔ سیاست خارجی عموماً شامل کمیتهٔ دائمی دفتر سیاسی و کمیسیون مرکزی نظامی حزب کمونیست چین می‌شود.

Jean- Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Foreign- and Security- Policy Decision-Making Processes under Hu Jintao,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2009), pp. 63–97. In the post- Stalin USSR, the FPE was largely synonymous with the CPSU Politburo.

۷۶. در مورد ویژگی‌های رژیم‌های «فردگرا» (یا مرد قدرتمند) در برابر ویژگی‌های حکومت‌ها و رژیم‌های ماشینی «غیرفردگرا» رجوع شود به:

Jessica L. P. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 6–7..

77. See, for example, Ian Kershaw, *Hitler*, 1st American ed., 2 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999); Walter Warlimont, *Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45*, (New York: Praeger, 1964); and Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, 1st American ed. (New York: Knopf, 2004); Jerrold M. Post, Amatzia Baram, and USAF Counterproliferation Center, *Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq Is Saddam* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, Air University, 2002).

78. See, for example, Peter Neville, *Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy of Sir Neville Henderson, 1937–39* (London: MacMillan, 2000); and Ripsman and Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?,” p. 163.

79. See Cordell Hull and Andrew Henry Thomas Berding, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan, 1948); Christopher D. O’Sullivan, *Harry Hopkins: FDR’s Envoy to Churchill and Stalin* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

80. See, for example, Asaf Siniver, *Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

- 2008), pp. 40– 70; William Burr and Henry Kissinger, eds., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York: New Press, 2000); William P. Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).
81. Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders*.
82. Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*.
83. Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).
84. See, for example, Russett, “International Behavior Research.”
85. “POLITY IV: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800– 2013,” [http:// www.systemicpeace.org/ polity/ polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) (accessed December 7, 2015).
86. See, for example, Galen Jackson, “The Showdown that Wasn’t: U.S.- Israeli Relations and American Domestic Politics, 1973– 75,” *International Security*, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015), pp. 130– 169.
87. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, pp. 205– 232; Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 64– 67; and James Mahoney, “Process Tracing and Historical Explanation,” *Security Studies*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2015), pp. 200– 218.
88. Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” a paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17– 19, 1997, Columbia International Affairs Online, [http:// www.ciaonet.org/ wps/ bea03/ index. html](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ bea03/ index. html) (accessed January 12, 2014).
- ردیابی فرایندی می‌تواند برای جستجوی ارتباط بین متغیر مستقل و متغیر وابسته در طول زمان مفید باشد. همان‌طور که در زیر بحث می‌کنیم:
- Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, pp. 58– 67.
89. Mahoney, “Process Tracing and Historical Explanation,” pp. 207– 210.

90. See Hal Brands, "Archives and the Study of Nuclear Politics," *H- Diplo/ ISSF Forum*, no. 2 (2014), <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf>, pp. 66–76 (accessed May 13, 2015).
۹۱. در خصوص راهنمایی برای کسب منابع دست اول در چندین کشور، رجوع شود به: Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 216–255.
92. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>, last accessed March 16, 2015. The full *FRUS* volumes for the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations are currently available online in PDF form, along with *1914, Supplement: The World War* and *1917–1972: Public Diplomacy*. Most US federal depository libraries subscribe to bound copies of *FRUS*, dating back to 1861. Digitized versions of earlier *FRUS* volumes are available online and searchable at the University of Wisconsin's Digital Collection <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS>, last accessed January 5, 2016.
93. The National Security Archive www.nsarchive.gwu.edu, headquartered in the Gelman Library at the George Washington University, is one of the leading nonprofit users of the Freedom of Information Act.
94. CWIHP and NPIHP are under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution. CWIHP <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project> and NPIHP <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/nuclear-proliferation-international-history-project>, accessed 9 April 9, 2015.
95. Presidential Libraries Online Finding Aids, US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), <http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/research/finding-aids.html>, accessed January 20, 2015. NARA oversees all thirteen presidential libraries and museums.
۹۶. به‌عنوان مثال، مقالات هنری کیسینجر و الکساندر هیگ در کتابخانه کنگره نگهداری می‌شود. کتابخانه خطی سیلی مود نیز در دانشگاه پرینستون قرار دارد.

97. See National Archives and Records Administration Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Reference Guide, <http://www.archives.gov/foia/foia-guide.html>, accessed March 16, 2015.
- وبسایت‌های اکثر ادارات و آژانس‌های قوه مجریه و همچنین کتابخانه‌های ریاست جمهوری دارای راهنمای آنلاین در خصوص درخواست‌ها هستند.
۹۸. اسناد کابینه بریتانیا، شامل صورتجلسه‌ها و یادداشت‌های سال‌های ۱۹۱۵ تا ۱۹۸۶، دیجیتالی شده و در آرشیو ملی قرار گرفته‌اند. رجوع شود به:
- <http://nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers>, accessed May 11, 2015.
99. See various chapters in Layna Mosley, ed., *Interview Research in Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
100. See, for example, Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, pp. 121–153; and Juneau, *Squandered Opportunity*, pp. 92–103.
101. Max Montgelas and Walther Schucking, eds., *Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924); and Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, eds., *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 1948).
102. Michael R. Gordon, “Archive of Captured Enemy Documents Closes,” *New York Times*, June 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/world/middleeast/archiveof-captured-terrorist-qaeda-hussein-documents-shuts-down.html?_r=0.
103. Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://crrc.dodlive.mil/2014/11/13/crrc-status-updatenovember-2014/>, accessed July 2, 2015.
104. See Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods and the International Relations Subfield,” *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 40, no. 2 (2007), pp. 170–195, at pp. 188–189.

Wesley, 1979), pp. 124– 128; and Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 28– 33.

2. See Jack S. Levy, “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, Concepts, and Research Design,” in *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*, ed. John Vasquez and Colin Elman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2002); and Daniel Nexon, “The Balance of Power in Balance,” *World Politics*, vol. 62, no. 1 (2009), pp. 330– 359.

۳. در مورد ایجاد موازنه‌سازی درون‌گرا و ایجاد موازنهٔ برون‌گرا (تشکیل اتحاد) رجوع شود به:

James D. Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade- Offs in the Search for Security,” *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1993), pp. 207– 233.

4. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 125– 128.

5. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 28– 33.

۶. اصطلاح «سیاست داخلی» [که اشارهٔ مسائل داخلی دولت‌ها دارد] چندین برنامهٔ تحقیقاتی مختلف را در بر می‌گیرد (به‌عنوان مثال، صلح دموکراتیک و غیره). در اینجا تمرکز ما عمدتاً بر روی نظریه‌های اقتصاد سیاسی یا مدل‌های سازگاری استراتژیک کلان و رفتار سیاست خارجی است.

7. Benjamin O. Fordham, *Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949– 51* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

8. Kevin Narizny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

9. Peter Trubowitz, *Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 16– 37.

۱۰. بسیاری از مورخان و نظریه‌پردازان روابط بین‌الملل اعم از واقع‌گرایان و منتقدان واقع‌گرای رواج رفتار متوازن‌کننده و تکرار توازن قدرت در اروپای مدرن و همچنین در سیستم‌های بین‌المللی مختلف غیراروپایی را زیر سؤال می‌برند. رجوع شود به:

Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763– 1848* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Curti Wohlforth, eds., *The Balance of Power in World History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); and David C. Kang,

East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

۱۱. یک واقع‌گرای نوکلاسیک موازنه‌های سیستمی قدرت را به‌عنوان یک تعادل طبیعی می‌داند و معتقد است که قدرت‌های بزرگ در نهایت در برابر ایالات متحد (تک‌قطب فعلی) توازن ایجاد می‌کنند.

Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

12. See Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1998), pp. 144–172; Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
13. Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2004), pp. 159–202, at 170–171; and idem., *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 47–48.
14. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, p. 49.
15. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 131.
16. Ibid.
17. Walt, *Origins of Alliances*, pp. 263–266.
18. Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 37–39; and Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, pp. 14–22.
19. Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 40–75.
20. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State

Building for Future War,” in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 194–226.

21. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats*, p. 63.

۲۲. همان‌طور که طی فصل ۵ نشان دادیم، همهٔ واقع‌گرایان نوکلاسیک نظریه‌های متوازن‌کننده را به‌عنوان یک رفتار پایه قبول نمی‌کنند. برای مثال، بروکس و وولفورث ادعا می‌کنند که تک‌قطبی ماندگار است و بعید است که تمرکز شدید قدرت در دست ایالات متحد و اکشن‌های متوازن‌کننده را تحریک کند.

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Assessing the Balance,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 24, no. 2 (2011), pp. 201–219; and idem., *World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 23–50, 60–97.

در جای دیگر، ولفورث و همکارانش هشت مطالعهٔ موردی در مورد ایجاد توازن و تعادل در شکست توازن در سیستم‌های بین‌المللی انجام می‌دهند که شامل دو هزار سال سیاست بین‌المللی در خاورمیانه، حوزهٔ مدیترانه، مرکز، امریکا، شرق و جنوب آسیا است. آن‌ها دریافتند که برخلاف نظریهٔ موازنهٔ قوا، هژمونی‌ها به‌طور منظم شکل می‌گیرند و دولت‌های درجهٔ دوم به‌ندرت استراتژی‌های متوازن‌کنندهٔ پایدار را دنبال می‌کنند. رجوع شود به:

William C. Wohlforth et al., “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 2 (2007), pp. 155–188; and Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth, *Balance of Power in World History*.

۲۳. این بحث مربوط موضوع قبلی است، زیرا واکنش به هژمونی نشان‌دهندهٔ یک مورد خاص از پاسخ به تهدیدهای خارجی یا از طریق ایجاد توازن (رقابت)، همکاری یا استراتژی‌های دیگر است. باوجوداین، بحث ما از سه جهت مهم متفاوت است. اولاً، بحث در اینجا در مورد واکنش استراتژیک دولت مورد تهدید نیست، بلکه در مورد نتیجهٔ سیستمی هژمونی از نظر دوام و صلح‌آمیز بودن آن است. در نتیجه، نشان‌دهندهٔ تغییر در تأکید بر دامنهٔ بلندمدت متغیر وابستهٔ ما است. دوم، توضیح ما در اینجا به محدودیت‌های داخلی دولت تهدیدکننده یعنی قدرت هژمون بستگی دارد، نه به محدودیت‌های دولت در معرض تهدید. در نهایت، به دلیل بازهٔ زمانی طولانی‌تر مرتبط با پیامدهای سیستمی به جای پاسخ‌های سیاست‌مندی، متغیرهای مداخله‌ای که در بحث خود از آن‌ها استفاده می‌کنیم تا

۳۲۶ ■ نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک سیاست بین‌الملل

حدودی متفاوت هستند، با تأکید بیشتر بر فرهنگ استراتژیک، نهادها و روابط دولت - جامعه، متغیرهای ادراکی، که نقش مهمی در بحث قبلی ما (رقابت)، همکاری یا برخی استراتژی‌های دیگر داشتند.

۲۴. ما از نونو مونتیرو پیروی می‌کنیم تا از اصطلاح مبهم «ثبات» به نفع عناصر دقیق‌تر دوام و صلح اجتناب کنیم.

Nuno P. Monteiro, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful," *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 3 (2011–2012), pp. 9–40.

25. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1981); William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), pp. 5–41; and Brooks and Wohlforth, *World out of Balance*.

۲۶. برای مطالعه گونه‌ای از نظریه انتقال قدرت که جنگ را به گردن قدرت‌های در حال ظهور می‌اندازد، رجوع شود به:

A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

گیلپین چنین استدلال می‌کند که هژمون رو به زوال احتمال بیشتری دارد که جنگی پیشگیرانه به راه بیندازد، رجوع شود به:

Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

27. Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," *International Security*, vol. 37, no. 3 (2012), pp. 5–51.
28. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," in *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 52.
29. Nuno P. Monteiro, *Theory of Unipolar Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 179–204.
30. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (1993), pp. 44–79; and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W.

- Norton, 2001), pp. 415– 416. For similar arguments, see Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” *International Organizations*, vol. 39, no. 4 (1985), pp. 579– 614.
31. See, for example, Norrin M. Ripsman, “Domestic Practices and Balancing: Integrating Practice into Neoclassical Realism,” in *International Practices*, ed. Vincent Pouliot and Emanuel Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 200– 228, at pp. 206– 207.
32. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” p. 63.
33. Laurence J. Korb, “U.S. Defense Spending After the Cold War: Fact and Fiction,” in *Holding the Line: U.S. Defense Alternatives for the Early 21st Century*, ed. Cindy Williams (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 35– 54, at p. 47.
34. See James McCormack, “Interest Groups and the Media in Post- Cold War US Foreign Policy,” in *After the End: Making US Foreign Policy in the Post- Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 170– 198.
۳۵. در مورد محدودیت‌های پس از جنگ ویتنام و واترگیت در سیاست خارجی ایالات متحد، رجوع شود به:
- Andrew Rudalevige, *The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 101– 138; and David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 3 (1997), pp. 505– 528.
36. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described Clinton’s foreign policy as “assertive multilateralism.” Madeleine K. Albright, “Myths of Peacekeeping, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1993,” *State Department Dispatch*, vol. 4, no. 26 (1993), p. 464.
37. John M. Owen IV, “Transnational Liberalism and US Primacy,” *International Security*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2001– 2002), pp. 117– 152; and idem., *Liberal Peace*,

Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

38. Ibid., p. 121..
39. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 61–79.
40. T. V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2005), pp. 46–71, quote at p. 53.
41. Norrin M. Ripsman, *Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post- World- War Settlements* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002).
۴۲. برخی، مانند اریک همیلتون، استدلال می‌کنند که نهادهای داخلی به‌واسطه محیط‌های خارجی که دولت‌ها با آن روبرو هستند، شکل می‌گیرند. بنابراین، دولت‌ها در محیط‌های خطرناک بین‌المللی احتمالاً نهادهایی را ایجاد می‌کنند که حداکثر استقلال را بر امور خارجی فراهم می‌کنند. در مقابل، آن‌هایی که با محیط‌های تسهیل‌کننده مواجه می‌شوند، احتمالاً نهادهای داخلی محدودتری را توسعه می‌دهند. رجوع شود به:
- Eric J. Hamilton, “International Politics and Domestic Institutional Change: The Rise of Executive War- Making Autonomy in the United States,” PhD diss., School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 2015.
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Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1865–1985 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Fordham, *Building the Cold War Consensus*; Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Steven E. Lobell, *The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); and Narizny, *Political Economy of Grand Strategy*.

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۴۷. البته، همان‌طور که گوا اشاره می‌کند، این نیروی محرک باید در یک سیستم چند قطبی حادثر باشد. در یک سیستم دوقطبی و احتمالاً در یک سیستم تک‌قطبی، دولت‌ها از تجارت متقابل خودداری خواهند کرد. باوجوداین، بعید است متحانان دستاوردهای تجارت را به اتحاد دیگری ببرند آن‌ها به تجارت درون اتحادی ادامه خواهند داد. رجوع شود به: Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 83, no. 4 (1989), pp. 1245–1256.

48. Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn*, pp. 26–29; and Fordham, *Building the Cold War Consensus*, p. 3.

49. See Lobell, *Challenge of Hegemony*, pp. 105–111.

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ما تصدیق می‌کنیم که سازه‌انگاری به نوعی هستی‌شناسی اشاره دارد، نه به مکتبی از نظریه روابط بین‌الملل. از آنجایی که ما می‌پذیریم که برخی از طرفداران نظریه‌هایی که متغیرهای فکری، فرهنگ یا روان‌شناختی را مطرح می‌کنند، از برجسب سازه‌انگاری اجتناب می‌کنند، سعی می‌کنیم در این بخش از این اصطلاح اجتناب کنیم. در عوض، ما از «ماده‌گرایی» و «انگاره‌گرایی» استفاده می‌کنیم.

۵۵. کیچن می‌گوید: «بسیاری از نظریه‌های روابط بین‌الملل بیش از حد به معرفت‌شناسی و هستی‌شناسی می‌پردازند، تا جایی که بحث‌های مربوط به وضعیت سوژه‌ها، خود سوژه‌ها و تحلیل‌ها را در بر می‌گیرد.»

See Nicholas Kitchen, "Ideas of Power and Power of Ideas," in *Neoclassical Realism and European Politics: Bringing Power Back in*, ed. Asle Toje and Barbara Kunz (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 85. We tend to agree.

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- برای بررسی منطق لیبرالیسم تجاری، رجوع شود به:
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- در مورد اهمیت کیفیت دیپلماسی به‌عنوان مؤلفه قدرت مادی و تعیین‌کننده سیاست خارجی، رجوع شود به:
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- علاوه بر والتز، فهرست اصلی شامل افراد دیگری مانند رابرت کوهن، استفن کراسنر، رابرت گیلپین، رابرت تاکر، جورج مدلسکی و چارلز کیندلبرگر، است که به‌عنوان حامیان اصلی «ساختارگرایی امریکای شمالی» یا نواقح‌گرایی شناخته می‌شوند.
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۳۵. رابرت جرویس سهم عمده‌ای در تحلیل سیاست خارجی (به‌ویژه در روانشناسی سیاسی) و همچنین در زیرشاخه‌های مطالعات امنیتی و مطالعات اطلاعاتی و توسعه واقع‌گرایی

ساختاری داشته است. برای تجزیه و تحلیل آثار جرویس در هر یک از این زمینه‌های مطالعاتی، رجوع شود به:

James W. Davis, ed., *Psychology, Strategy and Conflict: Perceptions of Insecurity in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

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برای مطالعه ترکیب بینش‌هایی از نظریه تصمیم‌گیری رفتاری، روان‌شناسی شناختی، اجتماعی و تکاملی و پردازش اطلاعات با نظریه‌های واقع‌گرا، رجوع شود به:

James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, "Psychology and International Relations Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2001), pp. 67–92.

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